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Structuring the Army for Full-Spectrum Readiness
MARK E. VINSON

From Parameters, Summer 2000, pp. 19-32.
"If we do not do something, we run the risk of a return to the hollow Army and a risk of not being able to
execute our national strategy."[1] -- General Dennis J. Reimer, 1998

Ironically, in the years since the US Army triumphantly watched the Berlin Wall crumble, archived its war plans for
the defense of the Fulda Gap, and stepped past the Cold War threat of global war, its warfighting readiness challenges
have grown with each passing year. Building for almost a decade, the military's dilemma came to a head on 29
September 1998 when, at a hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
acknowledged declining readiness levels and sought additional resources to mitigate risk. The Chiefs described the
degree of risk in stark strategic terms, stating that although the military was still ready to carry out the national
strategy, "The United States now faces moderate risk of increased casualties and prolonged conflict if it gets involved
in one war, and high risk if it becomes involved in a second war."[2] More recently, after two of the Army's ten active
divisions reported a readiness rating of C-4, the lowest rating possible, Army Chief of Staff Eric Shinseki assessed the
Army's ability to fight and win two major theater wars as "high risk."[3]
At its core, the Army's readiness challenges stem from a mismatch between mission requirements and forces. In the
wake of the bipolar stability of the Cold War, major theater war (MTW) has supplanted global war as the nation's
biggest security concern. As such, it is the most significant military requirement in the National Security Strategy
(NSS) and it has driven the Army's current force structure to resemble a cut-down version of the Cold War Army.
Defining a two-MTW requirement, the NSS states that "for the foreseeable future, the United States, in concert with
regional allies, must remain able to deter credibly and defeat large-scale, cross-border aggression in two distant
theaters in overlapping time frames."[4] However, since 1989 the Army has been called upon to do much more than
prepare for MTWs. In order to exert American leadership in an increasingly dynamic and uncertain post-Cold War
world, the two-MTW requirement has been folded into the broader imperative of engagement.[5]
Until recently, senior Army leaders resisted reorganizing the Army's force structure to more effectively and efficiently
focus unit capabilities and training on the full spectrum of missions required by the National Security Strategy. They
pointed out that the military's primary purpose is to fight the nation's wars and argued that the force structure should
not be shaped to perform lesser missions. Nevertheless, as the national strategy has evolved to increase emphasis on
global engagement, the Army's leaders have recognized the need to adapt the size and shape of Army force structure to
provide capabilities required by the NSS for the full spectrum of missions.
To increase the military's emphasis on the more relevant post-Cold War engagement requirements, while maintaining
focus on warfighting as the military's most critical mission, then-JCS Chairman John Shalikashvili adapted the
National Military Strategy in 1997 to require an integrated approach. This approach obligates the military to manage
the competing requirements to shape the international environment to deter or prevent threats, to respond to the full
spectrum of potential crises, and to prepare now for an uncertain future.[6] Implementation of this strategy has evolved
slowly as the United States explored the requirements of its role as the remaining superpower and increased its
commitment to shaping and smaller-scale responding opportunities. For the Army, maintaining acceptable readiness
levels to meet the competing demands and diffused focus of this strategy, with a significantly smaller force and
budget, has been an ongoing struggle.
To the Army, "readiness" specifically refers to a qualitative assessment of its ability to provide sufficient trained and
ready ground combat forces to successfully execute all of the requirements of the National Military Strategy. Anything

less than full-spectrum readiness engenders increased risk of either unacceptable expenditure of resources to achieve
success, such as too many casualties, or mission failure.
The Army's first purposeful step toward full-spectrum readiness was taken upon the arrival of General Eric Shinseki as
its new Chief of Staff in 1999. In his vision of the future Army, he stated that while "our core competency will remain
fighting and winning wars . . . we will also demonstrate our flexibility, our versatility, and our agility when responding
to a wider range of missions--including peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and operations designed to counter
emerging threats."[7] To achieve his vision, General Shinseki recognized the important role of each of the Army's
components, declaring an end to the term "Total Army" and insisting, "We are the Army, and we will march into the
21st century as the Army."[8] He further defined his intent for structuring the Army for full-spectrum readiness when
he said, "We acknowledge our components and their unique strengths. But we are the Army, and we will work to
structure ourselves accordingly."[9] In expressing his vision, the Chief of Staff has pointed the way ahead toward a
21st-century Army that is ready for the full spectrum of missions.
The balance of this article examines the roots of the Army's readiness dilemma and discusses potential approaches to
restoring readiness. It then focuses on framing an approach for the reorganization of the Army's force structure and
mission allocation to more fully exploit the vast manpower assets of the reserve components. The article suggests that
by reshaping the Army's force structure and reallocating its missions, it will more effectively and efficiently provide
ready and responsive forces to both major theater war and smaller-scale contingency requirements.
The Army's Readiness Dilemma
The increased readiness risk for the Army is the cumulative result of many factors, including a strategy that
overreaches the military's current capabilities, increased deployments with fewer forces and a smaller budget, and the
competing budget requirements for modernization.
General Colin Powell published the first post-Cold War National Military Strategy in 1992, establishing a minimum
"Base Force" capable of responding rapidly to defeat a regional aggressor, while maintaining enough forces so that the
United States and its allies would not be vulnerable to potential aggression elsewhere.[10] To accomplish its post-Cold
War military objectives, the Base Force strategy envisioned an Army with 12 active divisions, six reserve divisions,
and two cadre divisions.[11]
The following year, the Bottom-Up Review refined the Base Force strategy, formally establishing the two nearly
simultaneous MTW strategy that we have today. The Bottom-Up Review acknowledged that the Base Force was sized
to allow us to fight two MTWs plus conduct other concurrent operations. Nevertheless, it recommended that the
military's force structure be reduced to ten active divisions and five-plus reserve divisions in order to achieve the
expected post-Cold War "peace dividend." Additionally, it called for 15 Army National Guard (ARNG) brigades to be
enhanced to improve their readiness and offset the risk of the reduced number of active divisions in a two-MTW
scenario.[12] The Bottom-Up Review acknowledged that while this strategy allowed "us to carry forward with
confidence our strategy of being able to fight and win two major regional conflicts nearly simultaneously . . . it leaves
little other active force structure to provide for overseas presence or to conduct peacekeeping or other lower-intensity
operations if we had to fight two MRCs [major regional contingencies] at once."[13] Thus, the Bottom-Up Review
knowingly created an ends-means mismatch in the strategy by requiring the Army to conduct engagement missions
with forces required for the two-MTW mission. It also sought to offset the risk associated with reduced active forces
by enhancing the National Guard's readiness to fight.
In 1997 the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) reaffirmed the two-MTW strategy and further emphasized that we
must be able to transition to fighting MTWs from a posture of global engagement.[14] The QDR acknowledged that
withdrawing forces from smaller-scale contingency operations, reconstituting, retraining, and then deploying to an
MTW in accordance with required timelines "may pose significant operational, diplomatic, and political challenges."
However, with no apparent alternatives identified in the strategy, the QDR simply dismissed those challenges by
insisting that "the ability to transition between peacetime operations and warfighting remains a fundamental
requirement for virtually every unit in the US military."[15] Calling the transition of forces from smaller contingency
operations--where little or no relevant combat training is likely--to an MTW a "challenge" is an understatement of the

highest magnitude. At best, this strategy is wishful thinking; at worst, it is creating the conditions for a future highcasualty disaster.
The QDR reaffirmed the Bottom-Up Review's allocation to the Army of ten active divisions and 15 reserve enhanced
separate brigades (eSBs). The eSBs were specifically tasked to "provide an important hedge against adverse
circumstances--such as the use of weapons of mass destruction--in major theater wars by augmenting or reinforcing
active combat units."[16] The QDR pointed out that the ARNG's eight divisions are not included in existing major
theater war plans, and called into question their continued relevance.[17] So, while the current strategy appears to place
too many mission requirements on too few forces, the ARNG's divisions represent additional uncommitted force
structure available to the Army.
Since the end of the Cold War, the Army's senior leaders have sized, shaped, and justified the Army to fight two
MTWs. They structured the active force to provide the Army's primary combat forces. At the same time, they
organized the Army's reserve forces, the Army Reserve and National Guard, to provide critical individuals and units to
augment and reinforce active forces in time of war or national emergency. To conduct the secondary shape and
respond missions, senior leaders have generally drawn units from the MTW forces under the assumption that they
could be quickly extracted from a smaller-scale contingency if necessary.
A force structured exclusively to fight two MTWs seemed more reasonable immediately after the Cold War when the
military was searching for reasons to retain force structure, and when smaller-scale contingencies were historically the
exception and not the rule. However, since the end of the Cold War the frequency of deployments for smaller
contingencies has grown greatly. The United States responded to a total of 16 contingencies during the entire Cold War
period, from 1947 to 1989. But from 1989 to 1997, the United States responded to a burdensome 45 contingencies.[18]
In 1997, on average, more than 31,000 soldiers were deployed every day to 70 different countries around the
world.[19] Since the substantial Army forces that are globally engaged will generally not be immediately ready to
respond to an MTW, the Army has implicitly accepted the risk of this loss of responsive combat power.
Perhaps the truest measure of diminishing warfighting readiness, short of wartime performance, is the performance of
combat units at the combat training centers. In early 1999, the Army's Inspector General confirmed for senior leaders
that "entry-level performance at the combat training centers `continues to decline,' in part because units have fewer
opportunities to train at home station."[20] The IG's report goes on to cite several factors that inhibit unit training,
including lack of resources, absent or distracted leaders, unsynchronized modernization, the high pace of operations,
personnel turbulence, poor understanding of training doctrine, and diffused mission focus.[21]
The significant increase in deployments to smaller-scale contingencies is a primary reason that unit training suffers
from a lack of mission focus throughout the Army. US Army training doctrine recognizes that units do not have the
resources to be prepared for all missions; therefore, it calls for unit training to be focused on essential tasks derived
from missions. Although the Army focuses its peacetime training on its primary warfighting mission, frequent
deployments to non-combat operations divert the attention of an increasingly large share of the force. Most active
divisions have experienced one or more major deployments to conduct smaller-scale contingency missions in the past
decade. At any given time, many units are either in the preparation, deployment, or post-deployment training cycle for
a contingency mission, or supporting a unit that is. When not involved with a contingency, however, most units focus
their peacetime training on MTW tasks. Currently, the Army plans on six months of retraining as a rule of thumb
following a six- to 12-month smaller-scale contingency deployment.[22] Thus, by drawing its contingency forces from
the MTW force pool, the Army has instituted an inefficient cycle of unit training, shifting from a focus on warfighting
tasks to smaller-scale contingency tasks for a deployment, and back to warfighting tasks after redeployment.
The decrease in the Army's readiness has also resulted from other post-Cold War realities. Without the imminent threat
of global war and without a clear understanding of what the post-Cold War requirements would demand of its military,
the US government significantly cut military end-strength and force structure and slashed defense spending. From
1989 to 1997, the Army reduced its ranks by more than 630,000 soldiers and civilian employees and cut its combat
divisions from 18 active and ten reserve divisions to ten active and eight reserve divisions.[23]
The Army's significant decrease in buying power, especially with the increase in deployments since the Cold War, is

also certainly a major contributing factor to its readiness difficulties. Since the Cold War ended, the Army's budget has
decreased almost 39 percent, with the annual budget falling from $102 billion in FY89 to $64 billion in FY99.[24]
While the Army provided the preponderance of forces--more than 60 percent--in 28 of the 32 significant operations
from 1989 to 1998, the Army's share of the DOD budget dropped from 27 percent in FY89 to 24.9 percent in
FY99.[25]
Although maintaining current warfighting readiness remains the Army's top budget priority, underfunded
modernization requirements are in growing competition for limited budget dollars. Without significant and continuing
investment in new equipment, the Army's long-term readiness is threatened by old equipment that is expensive to
maintain and no longer dominates its competition. With information technology offering a possible revolution in
military affairs, and unexpected contingencies and current readiness requiring immediate funds, the Army has squeezed
money from efficiencies and made tough budget decisions in order to try to invest in its future.
Though presidential and congressional support for a modest increase in resources over the next five years looks
promising, returning to a level of acceptable risk will require the Army to do more than garner its share of a slightly
increased defense budget.[26] Whatever additional resources Congress may decide to give the Army will fix only part
of the problem. Certainly more resources will improve the funding of current readiness training, base operations
requirements, quality-of-life programs, and modernization accounts. But what about the negative readiness effects on
the Army of frequent deployments to smaller-scale contingencies? Even with more money, as long as the Army
continues to deploy its first-to-fight MTW forces to smaller contingencies, it still faces a significant, long-term
readiness challenge.
The Army is not likely to regain much of its lost end-strength, and an increase in the budget alone will not address the
destructive mismatch between mission requirements and forces available. It is time for the Army to apply internal
solutions to address its readiness shortfall.
There is perhaps no clearer signal that the Army has readiness problems that additional money will not solve than the
fact that it was recently compelled to deploy one of its first-to-fight divisions, the 1st Cavalry Division, to Bosnia to
conduct peacekeeping operations. On top of that, the 3d Infantry Division and 101st Air Assault Division are now
scheduled for rotations to Bosnia. In 1997, the QDR stated that "employing any of the Force Package I divisions for
peacetime engagement or smaller-scale contingencies would further increase the delay in meeting major theater war
timelines, and could put the halt phase at risk."[27] While the 1st Cavalry Division was focused on peacekeeping tasks
for more than a year (including train-up, deployment, peacekeeping, and redeployment time), how ready was the
division to deploy to a possible MTW?
If the Army does not have the forces necessary to execute the mission requirements of the national strategy, then what
about changing the strategy? Does the Army really need to be ready to fight two overlapping MTWs? The National
Security Strategy describes the reasoning behind this policy decision, saying that it "deters opportunism elsewhere
while we are heavily committed to deterring or defeating aggression in one theater. . . . It also provides a hedge against
the possibility that we might encounter threats larger or more difficult than we expected."[28] The two-MTW strategy
remains prudent and has withstood close and continuous scrutiny by many who seek to reduce or redistribute the
defense budget.
If the two-MTW requirement of the strategy is valid, then what about decreasing the frequency of engagement
missions around the world? Again, the National Security Strategy correctly rejects the alternative of isolationism and
asserts that "we must . . . continue to exert global leadership and remain the preferred security partner for the
community of states that share our interests."[29]
So, how can the Army improve its readiness to fight and win two MTWs at the same time that it improves its
capabilities and readiness to respond to the spectrum of potential smaller-scale contingencies? In response to recent
questions concerning the Army's readiness dilemma, General Hugh Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
remarked, "We never said we had enough to do two major theater wars and also do peacekeeping activities around the
world."[30] A larger budget can provide only temporary and incomplete relief to the Army's readiness challenges. It
cannot cure the debilitating mismatch between mission requirements and forces available. The remedy for this

mismatch will require major renovation of the Army's force structure.
Organizing for the 21st Century
The mismatch between mission requirements and forces available is not a result of the inadequate size of the current
force, but a result of the inappropriate shape of the force structure inherited from the Cold War strategy. Within the
Army, enough manpower exists to meet all of the mission requirements. It remains for the Army's leaders to articulate
a more concrete vision for the integration of the Army's components, organizing its force structure for successful
execution of the national strategy. This vision should describe a future force structure with unit-specific MTW or
smaller-scale contingency mission focus and organization. Essentially, the Army needs to reshape its forces to more
effectively and efficiently meet the full spectrum of requirements, thereby reducing the degrading effects of smallerscale contingency missions on the Army's readiness to conduct MTWs.
The Army's Manpower Reserve
An approach to improving the Army's readiness that has promise is to more fully exploit the vast manpower resources
of the reserve components. Out of necessity, the Army has already significantly increased its use of reserve component
forces to conduct current missions and relieve active-force deployment tempo. For example, in 1997 an average of 25
percent of the Army's forces in Bosnia were from the reserve components.[31] Due to the Army's integrated force
structure, a result of the Defense Department's "Total Force Policy," the reserve components provide unique and
essential capabilities to any force deployment package. Additionally, as noted above, a smaller active force has led the
Army to rely on reserve forces to pick up some of the increased mission load in order to relieve active-force
deployment tempo. Furthermore, deployment of citizen-soldiers is appropriate to invoke the nation's will for all major
contingencies, not just major wars.
Although the reserve components are busier than ever reinforcing and augmenting active forces all over the world, the
combat brigades and divisions of the ARNG remain largely on the shelf. Although General Reimer's white paper on
active-reserve integration offered that there are more than sufficient missions to justify the size of the whole Army,
only the 15 enhanced separate brigades have been assigned combat missions in current war plans.[32] The eight
ARNG divisions were generally assigned "to missions which include easing Army personnel tempo in peacetime
operations, providing rotation forces for extended contingencies, responding to domestic emergencies, and hedging
against the emergence of a more threatening international environment."[33] Though the eSBs and divisions have been
used very little, their potential contribution is clear. Elements of the divisions and the eSBs are now being tapped to
support ongoing, long-term contingency operations. Rotations of ARNG divisional elements, such as the successful
deployment of subordinate units of the 29th Infantry Division to Bosnia in 1997, and the projected deployment of
several ARNG division headquarters and some eSBs to Bosnia (which began with the 49th Armored Division
headquarters in March 2000), demonstrate the potential of the reserve divisions and brigades to contribute to the
Army's capabilities to conduct smaller-scale contingencies over extended periods.
Recognizing the manpower potential represented by these units, the Army decided in 1998 to convert 12 ARNG
combat brigades "to provide needed combat support and service support requirements identified as essential to the
National Military Strategy."[34] However, such limited use and restructuring of reserve forces only begins to tap the
reserve components' potential to provide "rotation forces for extended contingencies," as described in the QDR.[35]
With the right mission focus, force structure, and readiness enablers, much more of the reserve components' combat
force structure could contribute greatly to restoring the Army's readiness for the full range of missions.
Increased use of the reserve components is certainly not without cost. Without a careful, reasoned approach, the Army
could break this force. As a result of frequent and recurring deployments of reserve soldiers, cracks in the reserve
components have already begun to show. Lengthy deployments are straining employer support for the reserve
program, especially in small towns and small businesses.[36] The increased deployment demands also tax the reserve
components' training model. Thirty-nine days of training per year may not be enough to meet the increasing readiness
demands on a force that is frequently turned to for quick-response smaller contingency missions. If the Army is to
maintain healthy reserve components, trained and ready in time of war or national emergency, then it must develop a
long-term strategy that capitalizes on the inherent strengths of the reserves in a way that meets the intent of the Total

Force Policy without bankrupting the reserve system for the future.
It is time for the Army to adopt a strategy that does more than integrate the active and reserve components on the
fringe. The Army should restructure its forces and reallocate its missions to more effectively and efficiently use its
entire force to execute the two-MTW strategy.
A Two-MTW Force
The Army's most serious readiness shortfall is that it is not organized to provide sufficient forces ready to conduct two
MTWs from a posture of global engagement. According to the Bottom-Up Review, an active force of at least 12
divisions and eight reserve-enhanced equivalent divisions are needed to win two nearly simultaneous MTWs plus
conduct some smaller-scale contingencies.[37] Desert Storm required a US Army force of seven divisions, five of
which were armored or mechanized. Today, the Army has only ten active divisions, including six heavy divisions.
With at least three divisions currently committed or unavailable for rapid response to an MTW, simple math shows that
the two-MTW strategy is bankrupt and in need of a more realistic balancing of the ends, ways, and means necessary
for success. The Army is accepting unreasonable risk expecting units to quickly withdraw from smaller-scale
contingencies, reconstitute, retrain, and deploy to an MTW.
The Army should adopt an integrated approach guided by the principle that the active component be sized and
structured to do those missions that cannot be done by the reserve components. Generally, the active component brings
to the table forces maintained at the highest levels of readiness; therefore, they are responsive to missions that require
rapidly deployable forces. Likewise, the reserve components should generally be sized and shaped to provide the
forces that are needed later in a contingency, such as augmenting and reinforcing forces or follow-on rotation forces
for extended contingencies.
Accordingly, for the Army's two-MTW requirement, the primary combat forces needed for the first MTW and the halt
phase of the second MTW should be active component forces. However, the combat forces required for the decisive
counterattack phase of the second MTW should be primarily drawn from the Army National Guard.
The objective of the halt phase is "to halt the enemy invasion in forward areas and protect key assets and terrain
features."[38] The Army's mission during this phase is "to establish blocking positions on key axes of advance while
conducting a mobile defense in depth."[39] Key to preventing an MTW from becoming a prolonged and difficult war
is the success of the halt-phase fighting.[40] There is no doubt that the halt-phase force for the first MTW must be
ready to deploy immediately; therefore, it must be drawn from active forces maintained at the highest levels of
readiness. The second MTW's halt phase will also require active forces, for even as the first MTW forces deploy, a
second halt-phase force must be ready to deter an opportunistic rogue state from being tempted to initiate a second
MTW.
Phases II and III of an MTW call for the buildup of large combat forces and the subsequent "decisive counterattack
aimed at destroying enemy forces, restoring borders, and achieving key political goals."[41] Until recently, the Army
planned to use improved prepositioned materiel, airlift, sealift, and deployment infrastructure to reach a goal of
deploying a seven-division MTW force in 75 days.[42] In October 1999 General Shinseki announced his vision to
develop a more deployable, medium-weight Army capable of responding anywhere in the world with five divisions in
30 days.[43] In either case, for the first MTW these timelines require using active component forces in order to deploy
combat-ready soldiers. The 15 eSBs currently require at least 90 days to mobilize, train, and deploy to an MTW,
although the General Accounting Office still judges their capability to be "highly uncertain."[44] If activated soon
enough, later-deploying eSBs could be ready to augment the first MTW force, or they could deploy as the buildup or
decisive force element for a second MTW following the deployment of the active component halt-phase force.
To make this a realistic strategy, the Army needs to identify, structure, and train reserve brigades, or divisions, for
specific missions. Additionally, the national strategy must require these forces to be called up to begin postmobilization training by the time active forces begin to deploy to the first MTW. That's imperative. These forces need
to be called up for the dual purpose of preparing for their potential commitment as a hedge force in case of a more
difficult first MTW, or deploying as the decisive force for a possible second MTW. Building into the system the
acquiescence of civilian leaders to such a triggered early call-up of reserve component forces will be essential to

achieving an acceptable level of risk for the Army's readiness to fight and win two overlapping MTWs.
Realists will also recognize that the Army must improve the current readiness of the reserve combat units in order to
make this concept feasible. Even if the eSBs can achieve their aim of being ready for deployment within 90 days,
current doctrine requires the Army to build counterattack forces around divisions. Without a fundamental change in the
way reserve combat divisions are organized and trained, there is little hope of preparing them for combat within
required timelines. Although the Army may be moving toward a medium-weight force organized around brigades, the
near-term solution to improving reserve combat division and brigade readiness will require significant teamwork from
the active and reserve components.[45]
The answer to this problem may be found by integrating active-duty officers and NCOs directly into key positions in
reserve brigades and divisions and significantly increasing the number of full-time reserve support personnel within
the reserve units. This concept has been used effectively by the Marine Forces Reserve to provide units of battalion
strength or less to augment and reinforce their active divisions.[46] The Marine Corps integrates a combination of
active reservists and active Marines into its Selected Marine Corps Reserve units at a level of about 20 percent to
achieve deployment readiness by C+30.[47] During the Persian Gulf War, Marine combat battalions achieved credible
results, although most observers recommended increasing post-mobilization training time.[48]
The Army is progressing in the direction of the Marine Corps with its ongoing initiative to stand-up two active/reserve
integrated divisions. Two active Army headquarters have been given responsibility for the combat readiness of three
eSBs each.[49] Although these divisions are not currently structured as deployable entities, they could be further
expanded with personnel and units from each component to build full, multicomponent divisions.
The increased use of active and reserve observer-controller-trainers organized into Training Support Brigades to help
train high-priority reserve units is also an organizational step in the direction of increasing the use of active forces to
improve reserve force readiness. A further evolution of this concept would assign these leaders to key or shadow
positions in the reserve component units in the same way the Marine Corps integrates its active instructor-inspectors
into its reserve units. In addition to the direct benefit of improved readiness, the large-scale infusion of active officers
and NCOs into the reserve forces would also improve understanding and trust between the active and reserve
components. Although the active force structure costs associated with this plan would be high, the benefit of this
structure would be a more relevant and ready Army.[50]
To be sure, achieving universal support for such a concept will be difficult politically and a tough sell. The Army's
situation is more complicated than the structure of the federally controlled Marine Corps Reserve. The political
feasibility of generating support for such an integration of National Guard forces is greatly complicated by the Army's
need to gain support from the individual state and territorial governments, in addition to the federal government. As
leverage, the Army would be offering a more relevant combat role to ARNG divisions and eSBs. Realistically,
however, the end-state force structure would certainly require compromises in order to achieve necessary readiness
levels while maintaining political acceptability.
To establish its MTW force, the active Army should identify its halt-phase forces for both MTWs--at least one heavy
division each--and provide the resources and training needed to achieve the readiness levels required for that specific
mission. The Army also needs to identify the buildup and decisive counterattack forces required for both MTWs, and,
likewise, provide the resources and training needed to meet the readiness levels for this specific mission. This force
will likely require four to six additional divisions for each MTW, assuming that five to seven divisions are required to
win an MTW.[51] For the second MTW, the Army would need to organize and train four to six enhanced-readiness
reserve component divisions--perhaps hybrid active/reserve integrated divisions--to reinforce the active component
halt-phase force and to conduct the decisive counterattack. The units and individuals needed for these reserve
component divisions would be drawn from that part of the active force structure not required for MTW or smallerscale contingency missions, and from the existing ARNG eSBs and combat divisions.
Thus, a total of approximately six to eight active divisions and four to six reserve divisions would be needed for the
two-MTW requirements of the strategy. These forces should generally not train for nor be deployed to non-combat,
smaller-scale contingencies that erode readiness for their primary MTW mission.

A Smaller-Scale Contingency Corps
Key to preserving the readiness of the MTW forces would be a largely separate force, a Smaller-Scale Contingency
Corps, organized and trained to conduct the non-combat smaller-scale contingency missions. Here again, the active
component elements should be sized and structured to do those missions that require rapidly deployable, trained and
ready forces. Likewise, the reserve components should be sized and shaped to provide the forces that are needed later
in a contingency, such as augmenting and reinforcing forces, or follow-on rotation forces for extended contingencies.
In both cases, these units should be modular in design to facilitate rapid tailoring into force packages for a wide variety
of smaller-scale contingencies. Divisions may not be a flexible enough organization for this mission. Instead, perhaps
command and control headquarters organized and trained for the combined and joint operations that characterize
smaller-scale contingencies should be employed. Sub-units and individual augmentees could then be attached to
provide required capabilities for specific missions.
Some smaller-scale contingencies, such as the peace support operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Sinai, are likely to
require extended commitments of units. Therefore, the use of reserve forces for follow-on rotations is important to the
success of this concept. In most cases, active forces should provide the initial one or two rotations of forces. Reserve
component forces could then provide most of the follow-on rotations. Active forces could then train for the next
possible contingency. The Army would thus preserve a continuous capability to rapidly deploy a smaller-scale
contingency response force. With at least 12 months of lead time, reserve rotational units will have sufficient notice to
mobilize and prepare for the mission. Building an integrated force and having the commitment of the National
Command Authority and Congress to use reserve component units for extended deployments will also ensure that
commitments are made with the full support of the American people.
Both the active and reserve forces that are a part of this "Smaller-Scale Contingency Corps" would need to be
structured to provide the types of forces needed for smaller contingencies and given adequate recovery time between
missions. Their force structure should be shaped to more adequately conduct the most likely smaller contingency
missions (e.g., military police, civil affairs, light or medium infantry). The active forces should have sufficient
redundancy of forces to allow at least 12 months at home station between deployments. Additionally, the units' soldiers
and leaders should be rotated to the MTW units regularly to avoid retention problems due to deployment burnout.
Likewise, the reserve forces should be structured with sufficient redundancy to allow enough time between missions,
at least three to five years, to mitigate such adverse effects as strained employer support and recruiting and retention
problems.
Conclusion
With a more integrated approach, the Army can reduce the risk of fighting and winning two nearly simultaneous
MTWs from a posture of global engagement. With mission-focused structure, resourcing, and training, the readiness of
the Army will improve.
This concept requires a two-MTW force that relies heavily on enhanced readiness and active/reserve-integrated
divisions. It also requires a dedicated Smaller-Scale Contingency Corps that can deploy reserve component units for
follow-on rotations in extended contingencies. The result will be a more relevant and ready Army force structure for
the world of today, permitting the Army to place increased emphasis on preparing for the uncertain world of
tomorrow.
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